Feature matrix 

    A per-feature breakdown of what Basil does today versus what's planned. Basil is under active development: implemented items work in the current tree; roadmap items are deliberate gaps.

    Backends · Unlock & bootstrap · Identity & leases · Crypto & custody · SPIFFE & SPIRE · Attestation sources · Identity protocols · Operations & policy · Admin API · Developer ergonomics

    Backends 

    StatusBackendKindBuild statusCustody
    ✅OpenBao transit/KV-v2/PKIvaultdefaultIn-place backend crypto
    ✅HashiCorp Vault CE transit/KV-v2/PKIvaultdefaultIn-place backend crypto
    ✅Local encrypted SQLite-compatible key store (db-keystore / turso)keystoredb-keystoreMaterialize-to-use
    ✅1Password provider key storekeystoredefaultMaterialize-to-use
    ✅AWS KMS signer/encrypter backendaws-kmsopt-in aws-kmsIn-place KMS operation
    ✅Google Cloud KMS backendgcp-kmsopt-in gcp-kmsIn-place KMS operation
    ☐HashiCorp Vault Enterprise (untested)vaultroadmapIn-place backend crypto
    ☐SOPS/age file backend for static bootstrapTBDTBDPlanned
    ☐AWS Secrets Manager native value backendTBDTBDPlanned value-store backend
    ☐Azure Key Vault backendTBDTBDPlanned KMS/secret backend
    ☐Google Cloud Secret Manager native value backendTBDTBDPlanned value-store backend
    ☐PKCS#11 / HSM backendTBDTBDPlanned in-place HSM operation

    OpenBao and HashiCorp Vault CE remain the default strong-custody path: the backend performs private crypto in place and key bytes stay there. The keystore kind targets smaller / low-memory deployments: db-keystore seals its database encryption key in the bundle as DbKeystoreDek, and 1password seals provider configuration as OnePassword. Both materialize key bytes for one operation, then zeroize them. AWS KMS and GCP Cloud KMS are separate in-place transit backends. See Backends & custody.

    Unlock & bootstrap 

    StatusCapability
    ✅Sealed credential bundle with anti-rollback epoch sidecar
    ✅Sealed BackendCred variants for vault-compatible backends, db-keystore, 1password, AWS KMS, and GCP Cloud KMS. See Unlock & the sealed bundle
    ✅Public-key credential deposits: signed contributor records, sealed allow-list, startup overlay, and explicit promotion
    ✅age / YubiKey unlock slot (default build)
    ✅Production file-sourced passphrase unlock slot
    ✅BIP39 break-glass unlock slot (default build)
    ✅TPM-sealed unlock slot (auto-unlocks at boot from the host TPM; behind the off-by-default unlock-tpm cargo feature)
    ☐Shamir split-key unlock

    Identity & leases 

    StatusCapability
    ✅Generic JWT minting
    ✅DNS/IP-SAN TLS leaf certificate issuance from backend PKI
    ✅X.509-SVID and JWT-SVID issuance
    ✅JWT-SVID revocation deny-list and REVOKED watch events
    ✅NATS user, account, operator, signer, server, and curve JWT minting
    ✅NATS JWT signing (sign-nats-jwt): validate, normalize, and sign a caller-supplied claim document
    ✅NATS JWT signature/claim validation (ValidateNatsJwt: verify a token against its issuer NKey)

    Crypto & custody 

    Signing 

    StatusCapability
    ✅Raw-message signing contract (message, not caller-prehashed digest)
    ✅Ed25519 / EdDSA signing
    ✅RSA-2048 / RS256 JWS signing (generic mint-jwt + JWT-SVID issuer path)
    ✅ECDSA P-256 / ES256 and P-384 / ES384 JWS signing (generic mint-jwt + JWT-SVID issuer path)
    ✅ECDSA P-521 / ES512 backend-native signing (generic sign/verify; not a JWT issuer)
    ✅PQC ML-DSA-44/65/87 sign/verify: software custody, always built in
    ☐RSA-PSS signing · Ed448 signing

    Encryption & envelopes 

    StatusCapability
    ✅Transit-backed AEAD encrypt/decrypt with broker-owned nonces (AES-256-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305)
    ✅Client-side streaming encryption for files/large payloads (Rust basil::stream, Go stream)
    ✅X25519 sealed-box envelope encryption (wrap/unwrap KEM: X25519 ECDH → HKDF-SHA256 → ChaCha20-Poly1305)
    ✅PQC ML-KEM-512/768/1024 envelope WrapEnvelope/UnwrapEnvelope: software-custodied sealing keys
    ☐HPKE (RFC 9180) envelope encryption · JWS detached signatures
    ☐HMAC generate/verify · KDF / key derivation · backend random-bytes API

    Key management & custody 

    StatusCapability
    ✅Backend-native RSA-2048, ECDSA P-256/P-384/P-521, and Ed25519-NKey generation
    ✅BYOK key import for Ed25519, RSA-2048, ECDSA P-256/P-384/P-521 (single + all-or-nothing batch import-set)
    ✅Key rotation with grace-window version retention and archived-version pruning
    ✅Materialize-to-use key custody (X25519/ML-KEM unseal, value-store Ed25519 sign) with out-of-band public half
    ✅Key-store materialize-to-use crypto for db-keystore and default-on 1Password
    ✅PQC provider metadata labels and fail-closed unsupported handling
    ✅PQC ML-KEM-512/768/1024 NewKey provisioning and GetPublicKey read: software custody
    ☐PQC backend-native custody (Vault and OpenBao transit engines do not yet support native ML-DSA/ML-KEM) · ML-KEM key import

    SPIFFE & SPIRE interoperability 

    StatusCapability
    ✅gRPC SPIFFE Workload API: FetchX509SVID, FetchJWTSVID, FetchJWTBundles, FetchX509Bundles, ValidateJWTSVID with workload.spiffe.io header and SO_PEERCRED policy gating
    ✅rust-spiffe client interop tests (X.509/JWT-SVID fetch, rustls peer auth, live X.509 rotation, wire-compat)
    ✅go-spiffe client interop tests (FetchX509Context/FetchJWTSVID/ValidateJWTSVID with the workload.spiffe.io header, tlsconfig mTLS, JWT-SVID over HTTP, live X.509 rotation)
    ☐Cross-implementation interop matrix beyond rust-spiffe and go-spiffe (java/py/c SDKs)
    ☐SPIFFE Federation bundle endpoint server / client with periodic foreign-bundle refresh
    ☐Federation bootstrap using https_spiffe or Web PKI
    ☐SPIRE registration-entry import/export
    ☐SPIRE-style Upstream Authority integration
    ✅Initial Envoy SDS v3 integration for X.509-SVID delivery (FetchSecrets and initial StreamSecrets; rotation push and final hardening remain roadmap)
    ☐Trust-bundle cache persistence and stale-bundle policy

    Attestation sources 

    StatusCapability
    ✅SO_PEERCRED kernel attestation (caller uid / gid / pid over the local socket)
    ☐/proc exe path + Sha256
    ☐systemd unit identity · cgroup identity · container runtime metadata attestation
    ☐Kubernetes service account attestation · TPM-based node attestation
    ☐X.509 proof-of-possession attestation · pluggable attestor interface

    Identity protocols 

    StatusCapability
    ✅OIDC discovery document for JWT-SVID issuers
    ✅JWKS HTTP endpoint for non-SPIFFE JWT-SVID verifiers (http build feature plus [jwks] enable = true)
    ✅COSE sealed invocation profile with EdDSA and ES256 COSE_Sign1, preflight validation, protected Rust Sign responses, Rust helpers, and checked fixtures
    ✅NATS request/reply bridge courier for raw COSE request and response bytes
    ✅Go sealed-invocation build/open helper (clients/go/sealedinvocation: BuildRequest / OpenResponse, round-trip tested)
    ☐OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange using JWT-SVID as the subject token

    Operations & policy 

    StatusCapability
    ✅Local audit log (per-operation decision records)
    ✅Offline catalog + policy validation (basil config check)
    ✅Startup reconcile with capability enforcement and existence probes
    ✅Admin Status RPC (backend, version, protocol)
    ✅Hot reload for catalog and policy with generation pinning
    ✅Policy dry-run / explain mode (basil config explain, offline)
    ✅Admin health/readiness probes
    ✅Audit/log sink: OTLP / OpenTelemetry (otlp cargo feature, default-off)
    ✅Audit/log sink: journald
    ☐Prometheus metrics
    ☐Rate limits by uid/key/op
    ☐Emergency freeze by key, uid, or operation
    ☐Enforced multi-party approval (dual-control) gate for config changes

    Admin API 

    StatusCapability
    ✅Status returns broker version, backend, and protocol info
    ✅Health: liveness probe over the Unix socket
    ✅Readiness: readiness probe with structured reason codes
    ✅Watch streams an event feed (KeyRotated, BundleChanged, Revoked)
    ✅Reload: live catalog and policy reload without restart
    ✅Explain: policy dry-run with matched-rule detail
    ✅Revoke: JWT-SVID deny-list revocation

    Developer & client ergonomics 

    StatusCapability
    ✅basil CLI (keys, sign/verify, encrypt/decrypt, get/set, rotate, mint, NATS .creds, issue-cert, status)
    ✅basil get --format materialization (raw, hex, standard padded base64, base64-url-no-pad)
    ✅basil config check validates a catalog + policy offline
    ✅basil config init config/template scaffolding
    ✅basil doctor environment check
    ✅basil explain explains a policy decision against the live broker
    ✅Rust client library (basil crate, async + sync)
    ✅Go client library (github.com/openbasil/basil-go, package basil; spiffe + stream subpackages)
    ✅Cross-language streaming container interop (Rust reference CLI ↔ Go stream)
    ✅Rust sealed-invocation helper API and checked COSE fixture
    ✅Generated roff man pages (just man-pages / cargo xtask) and Linux basil-deb package
    ☐Python client
    ☐NATS resolver/operator bootstrap helpers
    ☐NATS auth callout helpers

    Where to go next